Negotiating M&As under uncertainty: The influence of managerial flexibility on the first-mover advantage

Using a dynamic real options approach we show that managerial flexibility is strengthening the first-mover advantage in bargaining M&As by undermining the bargaining power of the second mover.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Lukas, Elmar ; Welling, Andreas
Published in:	Finance Research Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 1544-6123. - Vol. 9.2012, 1, p. 29-35
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Real option \| Game theory \| Merger & Acquisition \| Negotiation \| Flexibility \| Ultimatum game

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance ; G13 - Contingent Pricing; Futures Pricing ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010574911