Net neutrality and welfare effects of discrimination on either or both the content side and the user side

Soo Jin Kim, Romain Lestage

We analyze the welfare effects of price discrimination by a monopolistic platform that mediates between two sides of a market. Discrimination is based on asymmetric costs on one side of the market and may be allowed on either or both sides. We show that unconstrained discrimination on both sides of the market improves welfare compared to uniform pricing but may be dominated by single-side discrimination. This result is driven by matching effects between sides, which add to the standard reallocation effects within sides

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Year of publication:	December 2, 2021
Authors:	Kim, Soo Jin ; Lestage, Romain
Publisher:	[Shanghai] : School of Entrepreneurship and Management, ShanghaiTech University
Subject:	Net Neutrality \| Zero-rating \| Price Discrimination \| Platform \| Network Effects \| Netzregulierung \| Access regulation \| Netzwerkökonomik \| Network economics \| Preisdifferenzierung \| Price discrimination \| Theorie \| Theory \| Wohlfahrtsanalyse \| Welfare analysis \| Internet \| Digitale Dienste \| Web-based service

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (circa 29 Seiten) Illustrationen
Series:	ShanghaiTech SEM working paper series. - Shanghai : School of Entrepreneurship and Management, ZDB-ID 3077705-7. - Vol. no. 2021, 011
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Graue Literatur ; Non-commercial literature ; Arbeitspapier ; Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3976072 [DOI]
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; L43 - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10012795764