Scholars have called for the Carnegie School to revisit fundamental ideas such as decision, behavioral plausibility (Gavetti, Levinthal, & Ocasio, 2007, p. 531), and the individual (Cohen, 2007). In essence, these calls urge greater realism, beyond the School’s founding concepts such as satisficing and bounded rationality, which differentiated organization science from economics. This paper argues that revisiting the School’s ties to Chester Barnard advances work along these lines because of Barnard’s experiential method and his findings on the subjective and objective nature of, and on the personal and impersonal forces entailed in, organization. The paper begins by discussing the insufficient recognition of the School’s ties to Barnard and the emphasis on Herbert Simon’s translation of Barnard at the expense of the original Barnard. Then, based on Barnard’s unpublished and lesser known works (O’Connor, 2012, p. 112–170), it shows the scope and depth of Barnard’s contributions: a new “organic applied social science” (Barnard’s phrase, Wolf, 1995a) founded on a subjective relationship to scientific knowledge and ordinary action that Barnard called “personal responsibility.” Likewise, this science emerged from Barnard’s relationship to his own experience, specifically, his pursuit of a science to explain his and others’ experience of organization.
