No conflict, no interest: on the economics of conflicts of interest faced by analysts

This paper outlines evolution of the policy response to conflicts of interest analysts face in offering investment advice to investors when the company they follow may also buy merchant banking services from their employer. Both in the US and the UK on a both statutory and common law basis the response has been one of to disclose and let market participants price the implied conflict or simply rebut the advice given. An efficient market can price conflicts and by implication unravel any potential damage to shareholder wealth induced by analysts’ conflicts of interests in this view. I consider the impact the presence of “noise traders” in financial markets may have on the welfare implications of this sort of policy stance. The presence of noise traders casts doubt on the benign impact of conflicts of interest in financial markets. In particular the presence of noise induced variance in analyst’s forecasts implies disclosure based remedies may be ineffective in mitigating the harm of analyst’s conflicts of interest. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013