Non-credible privatization
This paper analyzes government incentives in privatization and shows that governments' cheap talk results in non-credible policy. Ex-post, only bad firms will take a sequential strategy in privatization, which will reveal its type and lead to a price drop. These results are used to analyse China's share issue privatization plan and market reaction to it.
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Huang, Zhangkai |
Published in: |
Applied Economics Letters. - Taylor & Francis Journals, ISSN 1350-4851. - Vol. 13.2006, 14, p. 957-959
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Publisher: |
Taylor & Francis Journals |
Saved in:
freely available
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