Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium

We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core concepts is also provided.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2004
Authors:	Glycopantis, Dionysius ; Muir, Allan ; Yannelis, Nicholas C.
Publisher:	Vienna : Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS)
Subject:	Rationale Erwartung \| Bayes-Statistik \| Nutzenfunktion \| Spieltheorie \| Asymmetrische Information \| differential information economy \| rational expectations equilibrium \| coalitional Bayesian incentive compatibility \| implementation \| game trees \| private core \| weak fine core \| interim weak fine core

More details

Series:	Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series ; 148
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	741281783 [GVK] hdl:10419/72260 [Handle] RePEc:ihs:ihsesp:148 [RePEc]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293711