Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Andersson, Tommy ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
Published in:	Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 56.2008, 3, p. 350-354
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Indivisibles Fairness Coalitionally strategy-proofness

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005307825