Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited

This paper investigates an allocation rule that fairly assigns at most one indivisible object and a monetary compensation to each agent, under the restriction that the monetary compensations do not exceed some exogenously given upper bound. A few properties of this allocation rule are stated and the main result demonstrates that the allocation rule is coalitionally strategy-proof.

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Year of publication:	2006-05-03
Authors:	Andersson, Tommy ; Svensson, Lars-Gunnar
Institutions:	Nationalekonomiska Institutionen, Ekonomihögskolan
Subject:	Indivisible objects \| fairness \| coalitionally strategy-proofness

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Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published as Andersson, Tommy and Lars-Gunnar Svensson, 'Non-manipulable Assignment of Individuals to Positions Revisited' in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2008, pages 350-354. The text is part of a series Working Papers Number 2006:11 11 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005419350