Non-uniqueness of equilibria in one-shot games of strategic communication
Year of publication: |
2009
|
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Authors: | Valsecchi, Irene |
Publisher: |
Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) |
Subject: | Sender-Receiver Games | Strategic Information Transmission |
Series: | Nota di Lavoro ; 19.2009 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 644981350 [GVK] hdl:10419/53405 [Handle] |
Classification: | D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge |
Source: |
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Non-Uniqueness of Equilibria in One-Shot Games of Strategic Communication
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