Non-uniqueness of equilibrium action profiles with equal size in one-shot cheap-talk games

For strategic communication games à la Crawford and Sobel (Econometrica 50:1431–1451, <CitationRef CitationID="CR3">1982</CitationRef>) the paper shows that under some prior beliefs different equilibrium partitions of the state space can have equal cardinality. Hence, there can be different equilibrium action profiles with the same size. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2013

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Valsecchi, Irene
Published in:	Theory and Decision. - Springer. - Vol. 74.2013, 1, p. 31-53
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Cheap-talk \| Strategic information transmission \| Multiple equilibria

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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