Normative conflict and history dependence in repeated coordination games
Year of publication: |
October 8, 2018
|
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Authors: | Romero, Julian ; Zhang, Huanren |
Publisher: |
Tucson, AZ : Department of Economics, University of Arizona |
Subject: | Coordination | Normative conflict | Turn taking | History dependence | Laboratoryexperiment | Konflikt | Conflict | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | USA | United States | Theorie | Theory |
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