North-South Climate Change Negotiations: a Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and with asymmetric information in a dynamic framework. Results show that, depending on their characteristics, the different players can obtain benefits delaying the moment of the agreement.

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Year of publication:	2003-01
Authors:	Caparrós, Alejandro ; Pereau, Jean-Christophe ; Tazdaït, Tarik
Institutions:	Fondazione ENI Enrico Mattei (FEEM)
Subject:	Bargaining theory \| asymmetric information \| climate change \| international cooperation

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number 2003.09
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005570304