Observable Actions

We consider a game with " meta-players" who observe each other's actions before actual play. The observability exerts an effect like repeated games without discounting. The game has Nash equilibria with any individually rational payoff profiles. In addition, the outcomes that satisfy a modified version of evolutionary stability lead to Pareto efficiency in coordination games.

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Year of publication:	2012-02
Authors:	Ishii, Ryosuke
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Otaru University of Commerce
Subject:	Metagame \| Folk theorem \| Evolutionarily stable set \| Equilibrium selection

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	ビジネス創造センターディスカッション・ペーパー (Discussion papers of the Center for Business Creation).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Discussion paper series (2012), 145: 1-23 23 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604759