Oligopolistic Competition, Product Variety, Entry Deterrence, and Technology Transfer
This article develops a model of industrial structure and product variety when tastes are diffuse and when a firm must incur a fixed cost and design a product before producing. Pricing and output decisions occur subsequently. While standard Cournot-Nash and Bertrand-Nash equilibrium concepts typically fail to identify a unique equilibrium among a given set of producers, consistent conjectures determine a unique equilibrium. One aspect of this equilibrium is that consumers typically benefit from having majority tastes.
Year of publication: |
1984
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Authors: | Eaton, Jonathan ; Kierzkowski, Henryk |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 15.1984, 1, p. 99-107
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Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
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