On Bargaining Sets of Convex NTU Games

We show that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Peleg, Bezalel
Other Persons:	Sudhölter, Peter (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Verhandlungstheorie \| Bargaining theory \| Transferierbarer Nutzen \| Transferable utility

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Series:	Discussion Papers on Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, 19/2014
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 8, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2535161 [DOI]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040545