On Evolutionarily Stable Behavior in Contests

It is argued in this paper that the solution concept of an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is an adequate analysis tool for contest theory. Moreover, it is shown that in a contest ESS always differs from Nash equilibrium, the hitherto dominant solution concept in contest theory. Finally, an interpretation of finite population ESS contest behavior in terms of Nash behavior is supplied.

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Year of publication:	2002-07
Authors:	Leininger, Wolfgang
Institutions:	Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universität Dortmund

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	15 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005642211