On Finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's stable sets in spatial voting games

I present a proof on finiteness of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's majority stable sets in multidimensional voting games in the case of differentiable utility functions on Rk and 3 players. The central hypothesis is based on a light separation property which is real common for family of functions on R^k. Under the same hypotheses, the majority core is empty except for degenerate cases.

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Year of publication:	2009-09
Authors:	Ciardiello, Francesco
Institutions:	Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Dipartimento di Economia
Subject:	Stable sets \| Voting game \| Convexity

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Quaderni DSEMS.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008528387