On innovation cycles in a finite discrete R&D game

This paper shows that innovation (or Schumpeter's) cycles can be demonstrated in a discrete and finite dynamic game of innovation and imitation. We find that the cycles depend crucially on whether imitation is a credible threat and hence, we conclude that strategic interactions are sufficient to generate cycles in an innovation game.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Luckraz, Shravan
Published in:	Economic Modelling. - Elsevier, ISSN 0264-9993. - Vol. 30.2013, C, p. 510-513
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Innovation cycles \| Games of innovation \| Open-loop equilibrium

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010608281