On Myopic Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Endogenous Discounting

Bolt, Wilko

This paper derives an equilibrium for a competitive multi-stage game in which an agents'' current action influences his probability of survival into the next round of play. This is directly relevant in banking, where a banks'' current lending and pricing decisions determines its future probability of default. In technical terms, our innovation is to consider a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting. An equilibrium for such a multi-stage game with endogenous discounting has not been derived before in the literature

Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Bolt, Wilko
Other Persons:	Tieman, Alexander F. (contributor) ; Bolt, Wilko (contributor)
Publisher:	Washington, D.C : International Monetary Fund
Subject:	Dynamisches Spiel \| Dynamic game \| Theorie \| Theory

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