On platforms, incomplete contracts, and open source software

We analyze investment incentives for a firm A owning a software platform and an application and a firm B deciding whether to develop a new application for the platform. While B's entry helps the success of the platform, B fears ex post expropriation by A and is hence reluctant to enter and invest. We show that different platform governance structures prevalent in the Information and Communication Technology industry (integrated, proprietary, standardized, open source platform) serve to balance investment incentives for the platform and for the applications.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Niedermayer, Andras
Published in:	International Journal of Industrial Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-7187. - Vol. 31.2013, 6, p. 714-722
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Platforms \| Open source \| Standardization \| Incomplete contracts \| Property rights \| Information Technology

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; L86 - Information and Internet Services; Computer Software
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010730047