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On seller estimates and buyer returns

Alex Gershkov; Flavio Toxvaerd
This paper revisits recent empirical research on buyer credulity in arts auctions and auctions for assets in general. We show that elementary results in auction theory can fully account for some stylized facts on asset returns that have been held to suggest that sellers of assets can exploit buyers by providing biased estimates of asset values. We argue that, rather than showing that buyers are credulous, the existing evidence can serve as an indirect test of the rationality assumptions underlying auction theory.
Year of publication:
2006
Authors: Gershkov, Alex ; Toxvaerd, Flavio
Publisher: Mannheim [u.a.] : Sonderforschungsbereich/Transregio 15
Subject: Auctions | information disclosure | seller manipulation | buyer credulity | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Wertpapierhandel | Securities trading | Manipulation | Kunsthandel | Art trade | Rationale Erwartung | Rational expectations | Auktion | Auction
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