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On stable and strategy-rooproof rules in matching markets with contracts

Daisuke Hirata (Hitotsubashi University), Yusuke Kauya (Yokohama National University)
Year of publication:
September 25, 2015 ; This version: September 25, 2015
Authors: Hirata, Daisuke ; Kasuya, Yusuke
Publisher: Tokyo : Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University
Subject: matching with contracts | stability | strategy-proofness | uniqueness | efficiency | irrelevance of rejected contracts | "rural hospitalʺ theorem | Matching | Theorie | Theory
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