On the belief (in-)dependence of sequential equilibria

In this paper, we demonstrate that the existence of sequential equilibria may depend on the players holding beliefs which are tailored to the respective equilibrium but otherwise difficult to justify. We also discuss potential remedies.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Carlsson, Hans ; Wichardt, Philipp C.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 115.2012, 3, p. 504-507
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Beliefs \| Sequential equilibrium \| Existence

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010572218