On the benefits of being naive : the choice of contract duration with projection bias
Year of publication: |
June 2018
|
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Authors: | Bienenstock, Sophie ; Ropaul, Maïva |
Published in: |
European journal of law and economics. - New York, NY : Springer Science + Business Media, ISSN 0929-1261, ZDB-ID 1231592-8. - Vol. 45.2018, 3, p. 469-496
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Subject: | Behavioral law and economics | Consumer policy | Contract duration | Early termination fee | Projection bias | Dauer | Duration | Vertrag | Contract | Verhaltensökonomik | Behavioral economics | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Systematischer Fehler | Bias |
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