ON THE CHACTERISTIC NUMBERS OF VOTING GAMES

This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game. We present an upper bound on the number of alternatives which guarantees the non emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton and Salles (1990) for quota games.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	MARTIN, MATHIEU ; MERLIN, VINCENT
Published in:	International Game Theory Review (IGTR). - World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., ISSN 1793-6675. - Vol. 08.2006, 04, p. 643-654
Publisher:	World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Subject:	Voting game \| core \| stability set

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Extent:	application/pdf text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	B4 - Economic Methodology ; C0 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods. General ; C6 - Mathematical Methods and Programming ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D5 - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; M2 - Business Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005047548