On the Chacteristic Numbers of Voting Games

This paper deals with the non-emptiness of the stability set for any proper voting game.We present an upper bound on the number of alternatives which guarantees the non emptiness of this solution concept. We show that this bound is greater than or equal to the one given by Le Breton and Salles [6] for quota games.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Martin, Mathieu ; Merlin, Vincent
Institutions:	Centre de Recherche en Économie et Management (CREM)
Subject:	voting game \| core \| stability set

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes 1 & University of Caen).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005612184