On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical
Year of publication: |
1988-07
|
---|---|
Authors: | Emons, Winand ; Sobel, Joel |
Institutions: | University of Bonn, Germany |
Subject: | Liability law | Mechanism design |
-
Beckmann, Volker, (2006)
-
Tacit collusion and liability rules
Friehe, Tim, (2014)
-
On the Political Economy of Public Safety Investments
LANGLAIS, Eric, (2014)
- More ...
-
On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents Are Not Identical.
Emons, Winand, (1991)
-
On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical
Emons, Winand, (1991)
-
On the effectiveness of liability rules when agents are not identical
Emons, Winand, (1988)
- More ...