On the Equivalence of Information Design by Uninformed and Informed Principals

We compare information design, or Bayesian persuasion, by uninformed and informed principals. We show that, under the assumptions of monotone preferences of the principal and nondegenerate information structures, a Pareto undominated outcome is implementable by the uninformed principal if and only if it is implementable by the informed principal

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Year of publication:	2022
Authors:	Zapechelnyuk, Andy
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Asymmetrische Information \| Asymmetric information \| Informationsökonomik \| Economics of information \| Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie \| Agency theory \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (19 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4166364 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014080354