On the equivalence of optimal mechanisms with loss and disappointment aversion
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Benkert, Jean-Michel |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 214.2022, p. 1-4
|
Subject: | Disappointment aversion | Loss aversion | Mechanism design | Robustness | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Erwartungsnutzen | Expected utility | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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