On the equivalence of the Arrow impossibility theorem and the Brouwer fixed point theorem (forthcoming in ``Applied Mathematics and Computation''(Elsevier))

We will show that in the case where there are two individuals and three alternatives (or under the assumption of free-triple property) the Arrow impossibility theorem for social welfare functions that there exists no social welfare function which satisfies transitivity, Pareto principle, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and has no dictator is equivalent to the Brouwer fixed point theorem on a 2-dimensional ball (circle).

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Year of publication:	2005-06-16
Authors:	Tanaka, Yasuhito
Institutions:	EconWPA

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Public Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf
Classification:	D6 - Welfare Economics ; D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; H - Public Economics
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005125940