On the Existence and Uniqueness of Bayesian Matching Equilibrium in a Public Good Economy

In the matching mechanism of incomplete information, the preferences and endowment of players change with the types of players. Before insight into the state of nature, the player cannot be certain of the types of other players. Based on Cornes and Hartley's aggregative game approach, this paper gives four conditions for the existence of a unique equilibrium in Bayesian matching game

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Year of publication:	[2022]
Authors:	Liu, Chengkui ; Huang, Xiongcai ; Yu, Yue
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Matching

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: EL53706
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.4040565 [DOI]
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013299669