On the existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games

We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant results.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Carbonell-Nicolau, Oriol ; McLean, Richard P.
Publisher:	New Brunswick, NJ : Rutgers University, Department of Economics
Subject:	Bayesian game \| discontinuous game \| infinite game of incomplete information \| behavioral strategy \| distributional strategy \| payoff security

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Series:	Working Paper ; 2015-13
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	842384448 [GVK] hdl:10419/130743 [Handle] RePEc:rut:rutres:201513 [RePEc]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011460738