On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games with a Continuum of Players
We present results on the existence of pure strategy Nash equilbria in nonatomic games We also show by means of counterexamples that the stringent conditions on the cardinality of actions sets cannot be relaxed and thus resolve questions which have remained open since Schmeidler's 1973 paper
Year of publication: |
1994-01
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Authors: | Khan, M Ali ; Rath, Kali P ; Sun, Yeneng |
Institutions: | Department of Economics, Johns Hopkins University |
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