On the implementability of contracts without quasilinear utility

Implementability conditions in Rochet (1987) are extended to utility functions not necessarily quasilinear in the transfer, or linear in the type, for the case where agents’ information is one-dimensional but actions become multidimensional. The results obtained are relevant for the characterization of optimal mechanisms in adverse selection and moral hazard problems.

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Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Ruiz del Portal, X.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 116.2012, 1, p. 42-45
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Incentive compatibility \| Monotonicity constraints \| Optimal mechanisms

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; H21 - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation ; H23 - Externalities; Redistributive Effects ; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010576432