On the Interpretation of the Nash Bargaining Solution and Its Extension to Non-expected Utility Preferences.

This paper questions the interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution. A new definition is suggested. Revisions of Nash axioms characterize the solution. The definition makes possible its extension to non-expected-utility preferences. It also reveals the logic behind the comparative statics of risk aversion and the connection between the Nash bargaining solution and strategic models. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.

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Year of publication:	1992
Authors:	Rubinstein, Ariel ; Safra, Zvi ; Thomson, William
Published in:	Econometrica. - Econometric Society. - Vol. 60.1992, 5, p. 1171-86
Publisher:	Econometric Society

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005130078