On the Legitimacy and Democratic Accountability of the European Central Bank : Legal Arrangements and Practical Experience

Various authors have questioned the legal framework of the European System of Central Banks and of the European Central Bank (ECB), which undoubtedly concentrates on ensuring the independence of the system, rather than introducing a democratically accountable monetary policy authority. Rather than to revisit all facets of the well-known case for the democratic accountability of the ECB, this contribution highlight the ways in which the democratic accountability of the ECB has developed in the first years of its coming into operation as the single monetary policy authority in the Euro-zone. Three main elements are identified in this context, including the approach to monetary policy objectives of the ECB, its communication strategy vis-¿-vis the financial markets and the public at large and its regular contacts with the European Parliament. All of these elements refer to the transparency of the ECB. Indeed, information may be considered as the key to the evaluation of the performance of a central bank and thus, to democratic accountability. Information requires transparency because where a central bank does not conduct monetary policy in an open manner, information on the performance of the bank is difficult to acquire. What results from this analysis is that while the current legal arrangements relating to the democratic accountability of the ECB can certainly be criticised for their shortcomings, it also has to be acknowledged that despite the limited obligations under the EC Treaty the ECB has undergone considerable efforts to become a transparent central bank, thereby enhancing democratic accountability. Yet, the fact remains that it is up to the ECB to decide on the means and extent to which it provides this transparency. As a result, the ECB appears to be very transparent on paper, whereas the financial markets, but indeed also the MEPs seem to have considerable difficulties with understanding the monetary policy strategy of the ECB. All things considered, the ECB also has to be given credit for the constructive way in which it has interpreted its obligation under the EC Treaty to appear before the EP. By appearing four times a year, the ECB once more does more than would be legally required. It can already be concluded that that the EP takes the role, which it has been assigned to under the Maastricht Treaty very serious. Indeed, it may understand this role as a welcome opportunity to show once more that it is a fully, grown parliament which is willing to take on more substantial responsibilities in the constitutional structure of the European Union