On the (non) existence of a price equilibrium in delegation games with relative performance compensation
Year of publication: |
January 16, 2012
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Authors: | Kopel, Michael ; Lambertini, Luca |
Publisher: |
Bologna, Italy : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics |
Subject: | managerial firms | Bertrand competition | delegation | equilibrium existence | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Duopol | Duopoly | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model | Preiswettbewerb | Price competition | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Führungskräfte | Managers | Oligopol | Oligopoly | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay |
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