On the nonemptiness of approximate cores of large games

We provide a new proof of the non-emptiness of approximate cores of games with many players of a finite number of types. Earlier papers in the literature proceed by showing that, for games with many players, equal-treatment cores of their "balanced cover games", which are non-empty, can be approximated by equal-treatment e-cores of the games themselves. Our proof is novel in that we rely on a fixed point theorem.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Allouch, Nizar ; Wooders, Myrna
Publisher:	London : Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance
Subject:	NTU games \| Core \| Approximate cores \| Small group effectiveness \| Coalition formation \| Payoff dependent balancedness

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Series:	Working Paper ; 726
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	817148752 [GVK] hdl:10419/122066 [Handle] RePEc:qmw:qmwecw:wp726 [RePEc]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380988