On the notion of perfect bayesian equilibrium

Julio González-Díaz; Miguel A. Meléndez-Jiménez

Often, perfect bayesian equilibrium is loosely defined by stating that players should be sequentially rational given some beliefs in which Bayes rule is applied whenever possibleʺ. We show that there are games in which it is not clear what whenever possibleʺ means. Then, we provide a simple definition of perfect bayesian equilibrium for general extensive games that refines both weak perfect equilibrium and subgame perfect equilibrium. -- non-cooperative game theory ; equilibrium concepts ; perfect bayesian ; Bayes rule

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	González-Díaz, Julio ; Meléndez-Jiménez, Miguel A.
Publisher:	Evanston : Northwestern Univ., Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Bayes-Statistik \| Bayesian inference