ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF IMMIGRATION AND INCOME REDISTRIBUTION
In this article, we analyze an economy in which agents vote over immigration policy and redistributive tax policy. We show that natives' preferences over immigration are influenced by the prospect that immigrants will be voting over future tax policy. We also show that changes in the degree of international capital mobility, the distribution of initial capital among natives, the wealth or poverty of the immigrant pool, and the future voting rights and entitlements of immigrants can have dramatic effects on equilibrium immigration and tax policies. Finally, we provide some empirical support for the model's predictions. Copyright 2004 by the Economics Department Of The University Of Pennsylvania And Osaka University Institute Of Social And Economic Research Association.
Year of publication: |
2004
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Authors: | Dolmas, Jim ; Huffman, Gregory W. |
Published in: |
International Economic Review. - Department of Economics. - Vol. 45.2004, 4, p. 1129-1168
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Publisher: |
Department of Economics |
Saved in:
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