On the possibility of licensing in a market with logit demand functions

We analyze the incentives for technology transfer between two firms in a market characterized by a logit demand framework. The available licensing policies of the incumbent innovator are the up front fee, royalty and two-part tariff policies. We show that when the market is covered there is no equilibrium where technology transfer occurs.

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Year of publication:	2008-06-13
Authors:	Stamatopoulos, Giorgos
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 4.2008, 17, p. 1-11
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010835851