On the private provision of contentious public characteristics

Richard Cornes; Dirk Rübbelke

We extend the standard public good provision model to allow players to either like or dislike the public characteristic. Those who dislike it are able to take actions to reduce its level. We present conditions under which the existence of a unique noncooperative equilibrium is retained, and analyze its normative and comparative static properties. -- public goods ; public bads ; aggregative games

Year of publication:	2012
Authors:	Cornes, Richard ; Rübbelke, Dirk T. G.
Publisher:	München : CESifo
Subject:	Öffentliche Güter \| Public goods \| Allokation \| Allocation \| Nichtkooperatives Spiel \| Noncooperative game \| Theorie \| Theory

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