On the properties of linear supply functions in oligopoly

Flavio Delbono, Luca Lambertini

In this note we revisit the result by Menezes and Quiggin (2012), showing that under linear supply function competition, the same Nash equilibrium results when arms choose slopes or intercepts of their supply functions. This is because the first order conditions emerging in the two strategy spaces are not linearly independent.

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Year of publication:	June 18, 2015
Authors:	Delbono, Flavio ; Lambertini, Luca
Publisher:	Bologna, Italy : Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Department of Economics
Subject:	supply function \| linear independence \| Oligopol \| Oligopoly \| Theorie \| Theory \| Angebot \| Supply

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