On the Shapley value of a minimum cost spanning tree problem

We associate an optimistic coalitional game with each minimum cost spanning tree problem. We define the worth of a coalition as the cost of connection assuming that the rest of the agents are already connected. We define a cost sharing rule as the Shapley value of this optimistic game. We prove that this rule coincides with a rule present in the literature under different names. We also introduce a new characterization using a property of equal contributions.

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Year of publication:	2005-09-01
Authors:	Bergantiños, Gustavo ; Vidal-Puga, Juan
Institutions:	EconWPA
Keywords:	minimum cost spanning tree problems Shapley value

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 17 17 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005062325