On the Size of the Winning Set in the Presence of Interest Groups

Interest groups are introduced in a spatial model of electoral competition between two political parties. We show that the presence of these interest groups increases the winning set, which is the set of policy platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Therefore, interest groups enhance the probability of the challenger winning the election

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Year of publication:	[2021]
Authors:	Sadiraj, Vjollca ; Tuinstra, Jan ; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Interessenvertretung \| Interest group \| Neue politische Ökonomie \| Public choice \| Ökonomische Theorie der Demokratie \| Economic theory of democracy \| Abstimmungsregel \| Voting rule \| Räumliche Interaktion \| Spatial interaction \| Wahlkampf \| Electoral campaign

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