On the value of persuasion by experts

A sender can influence the behavior of a receiver by controlling the informativeness of a public signal. We show that the sender cannot benefit from becoming an expert, that is, from privately learning some information about the state. We then show that in some instances an uninformed sender is ex-ante strictly better off than an expert sender.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014-06-03
Authors:	Alonso, Ricardo ; Câmara, Odilon
Institutions:	London School of Economics (LSE)
Subject:	information control \| persuasion \| experts

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	6 pages
Classification:	D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126502