On the value of relative comparisons in firms

In a principal–agent model, we find that firms may not always benefit from the relative concerns of agents if such concerns are heterogeneous. Further, accounting for the influence of the environment on such concerns, profits are reduced relative to the no-comparisons benchmark.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Ramalingam, Abhijit
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 124.2014, 3, p. 446-448
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Comparisons \| Incentives \| Context-dependence \| Profits

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010930738