On Two-Player Repeated Games with Lack of Information on One Side and State-Independent Signalling

We consider two-person undiscounted repeated games with lack of information on one side and state-independent signalling and prove the existence of a "joint plan" uniform equilibrium.

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Year of publication:	2000
Authors:	Renault, Jérôme
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine (Paris IX)
Subject:	Repeated games \| incomplete information \| imperfect monitoring \| uniform equilibrium \| existence of equilibria

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Extent:	application/postscript
Series:	Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Mathematics of Operations Research, 2000, Vol. 25, no. 4. pp. 552-572.Length: 20 pages
Classification:	D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010706451