One dimensional mechanism design
Year of publication: |
May 2017
|
---|---|
Authors: | Moulin, Hervé |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric Society. - New York, NY : Econometric Society, ISSN 1933-6837, ZDB-ID 2398911-7. - Vol. 12.2017, 2, p. 587-619
|
Subject: | Single-peaked preferences | strategyproof mechanisms | leximin ordering | voting | rationing | Präferenztheorie | Theory of preferences | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Wahlverhalten | Voting behaviour | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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