One-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with private information

This study analyzes one-leader and multiple-follower Stackelberg games with demand uncertainty. We demonstrate that the weight on public information regarding a follower’s estimation of demand uncertainty determines the strategic relationship between the leader and each follower. When the relationship is strategic complement, the leader can exit from a market. The threshold is determined by the intensity of Cournot competition among the followers.

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Nakamura, Tomoya
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 127.2015, C, p. 27-30
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Stackelberg competition \| Cournot competition \| First and second mover advantages \| Public and private information

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011189561